A profitable passive technique must be a fairly systematic or mechanical technique. It ought to have actual basic underpinnings and empirically confirmed.
It ought to take into account the cruel realities that plague the markets (that many individuals refuses to acknowledge). That good corporations can flip. And poor corporations can provide good returns. That enterprise is difficult. That areas undergo intervals of challenges, similar to sectors.
A extra sturdy technique is one which not tries to avert these realities however to contemplate them and nonetheless tries to reap the dangers however to not be uncovered to the danger of break as a result of cash is significant sufficient for us and we don’t wish to lose it.
I wrote a number of articles exploring in regards to the basic underpinnings of a technique that target persistently proudly owning a diversified portfolio of worthwhile securities with excessive 10% earnings yield, that has zero progress.
I want to discover from the angle not about outperformance however from the conservatism angle.
You possibly can learn a number of of them right here:
- If You Fail to Spend money on the Finest Area, Sectors or Elements, How Dangerous Are Your Returns?
- What does Avantis International Small Cap Worth UCITS ETF’s 23% Money Circulate Yield Means?
- Does Eliminating Unprofitable Small Caps Enhance Lengthy Time period Small Cap Index Efficiency?
You would possibly discover it’s not the same old exploration of “Is the returns compensating dangers?”, or “Does it outperform the market?”, or “Does it outperform the market index?”
Past these, if we’re utilizing it for our actual planning, the very very first thing to have a look at is to invert.
If issues don’t go effectively with this technique what does dangerous appear to be?
It most likely means drawdowns and the way deep in a “quick” interval however how quick. We deduce we most likely want 15-20 years. If you’re drawing revenue, if it exist some poor drawdown sequences, regardless of the potential excessive returns, you would possibly want to contemplate that and don’t allocate a lot in it.
I felt that if a technique is fairly conservative primarily based on its development, in opposition to the dangers that we don’t actually need (dropping our cash, not making returns), accepting those who we are able to settle for (simply how a lot is the returns), this is a crucial subject.
However evidently:
- Nobody is sufficient to debate with me.
- Not many individuals are effectively discovered sufficient and fulfill #1 to debate with me.
- I don’t know the effectively discovered sufficient folks.
Nonetheless it burns me sufficient that on a day after I was fairly drained doing a number of items of labor. I wrote a query like this to an LLM:
There are some corporations like a inventory A with zero earnings progress for the subsequent 15 years. However inventory A occurs to commerce at 12-8% earnings yield. If inventory A doesn’t develop earnings they usually take the cash to purchase again shares or pay out as dividend yield, The inventory probably will commerce on the similar place however the inventory will earn 15 years of returns near this earnings yield.
If we put money into a single inventory, the inventory might not final 15 years, or it should develop, or that it’ll thrive much more. So a single inventory is a guess and could be dangerous particularly you rely all of this cash. My conjecture is can we obtain the identical factor if we put money into a diversified portfolio of 1300 shares, throughout a number of areas, they’re small or mid caps, diversified throughout sectors.
We are going to reconstitute the portfolio ceaselessly however in small portions within the yr, controlling the turnover in order that the expense ratio is nearer to 0.40%. We are going to exclude non-profitable shares. for these that’s left, we are going to choose the 1300 that ranks the very best in working money circulation, adjusted for accruals to their e book worth.
By reconstituting the portfolio, it make sure that these potential corporations that finally might die can be systematically eliminated. On the similar time shares might transfer up or down and people shares that achieve rather a lot, bought the earnings yield compressed can even be modified at reconstitution.
Would such a portfolio be the last word secure technique that received’t die, and earn its beginning earnings yield?
If the beginning earnings yield primarily based on these standards is 10%, can we earn 10% p.a. in value return if we make investments sufficient (say 15-20 years)?
In a manner, we’re not searching for issue outperformance however extra give attention to can we earn a good return? A lot is debated in regards to the measurement, worth issue and we’re not doing that however genuinely asking, can the vital characteristic guarantee we earn some respectable return if we make investments lengthy sufficient.
I assumed after I learn the reply, it cleared up a variety of issues for me.
So i’ll share it right here.
These in inexperienced field is my feedback.
Explaining the Technique in Plain English
In a manner, I battle to clarify with out jargons a lot, however many battle to give attention to the essence of what might make the portfolio work. I assumed it described the technique and what it outcomes to, in on a regular basis operation fairly effectively:
Think about you aren’t selecting shares. You might be working a machine.
The machine has one job: at any given second, maintain a big assortment of small and medium-sized companies from around the globe which are genuinely worthwhile and are priced cheaply relative to the precise money they generate. Not low cost relative to hype, not low cost relative to what analysts forecast — low cost relative to the true money that already got here out of the enterprise final yr, after stripping out the accounting tips.
The machine doesn’t fall in love with any firm. When an organization’s value rises a lot that it not appears to be like low cost on this measure, the machine quietly sells somewhat of it and makes use of that cash to purchase one thing that also appears to be like low cost. When an organization stops being worthwhile, the machine removes it earlier than it turns into a major problem. It does this constantly, in small quantities all year long, so it’s by no means doing one dramatic overhaul that might value rather a lot in buying and selling charges.
At any cut-off date, the gathering of companies contained in the machine is producing roughly 10 cents of actual working money for each greenback you will have invested. A few of these companies pays that money out as dividends. Some will use it to purchase again their very own shares, which makes your remaining shares value somewhat extra. Some will reinvest it correctly, some poorly. However in mixture, throughout 1,300 companies in numerous nations and completely different industries, the money era is actual and it’s diversified sufficient that no single catastrophe issues a lot.
What you’re betting on isn’t that any particular firm will thrive. You might be betting that the machine — the method of constantly proudly owning worthwhile, cash-generative companies at low cost costs — will hold delivering that 10% money yield to you, yr after yr, for 15 to twenty years. And that over that size of time, the buildup of that money is the dominant driver of what you earn.
The turnover management — preserving it low sufficient that complete prices keep round 0.40% per yr — isn’t a minor operational element. It’s what separates a machine that earns 9–10% from one which earns 7–8%. The technique lives or dies on whether or not the yield it captures is bigger than the friction it generates in capturing it.
This can be a Principally Sound Technique with an Anticipated Return Vary (10% Yield) of between 7 – 12%

The Earnings Yield Portfolio Thesis: 1,300 shares. International small & mid-cap. Reconstituted ceaselessly. Ranked by working money circulation yield adjusted for accruals.
The longevity of this technique (15 – 20 years) is Very Excessive.
The way it appears to be like at my conjecture:
a. Diversification eliminates stock-specific mortality threat [Correct][Well Documented]
At 1,300 names throughout areas and sectors, any single firm’s failure is at most a 0.08% portfolio occasion. That is the right framing — the conjecture isn’t that no firm dies, however that the portfolio doesn’t die. That distinction is your complete perception.
b. Reconstitution is the vital survival mechanism [Correct and underappreciated]
By systematically eradicating deteriorating names at every reconstitution, you replicate what a single immortal inventory would wish to do by itself. That is crucial conceptual perception in your conjecture — the portfolio identification persists even because the parts flip over. Consider it because the Ship of Theseus, however intentional.
c. Profitability filter and OCF/Guide rating are precisely proper [Strongly supported by evidence][Operating CF vs EPS: Superior Metric]
Excluding non-profitable shares dramatically reduces holding mortality. Money circulation over accrual-based earnings is the right metric — working money circulation adjusted for accruals is the cleanest measure of financial yield and is materially tougher to govern. Novy-Marx (2013) and Fama-French (2015) each assist this straight.
Money circulation profitability means utilizing Working Money Circulate within the Money Circulate assertion. It leaves depreciation, curiosity, taxes, stock-based compensation inside, doesn’t deduct capital expenditure. It additionally adjusts for impairments.
d. You’ll NOT earn precisely 10% — however 10% is your anchor [Approximately correct][+- 2-3% band is realistic]
Your precise return equals: beginning earnings yield + earnings progress + valuation re-rating − transaction prices. With zero assumed progress and nil re-rating, a ten% yield earns 10% in principle. In apply, small/mid transaction prices eat 1–2.5%, valuation drift provides noise, and foreign money strikes matter. The reasonable vary over 15–20 years is 7–12% p.a. The beginning yield is the dominant driver — however it’s an anchor, not a promise.
I clarified right here that the transaction value must be a lot decrease and so if we management that it must be much less of an element.
e. Small/mid-cap bias provides return potential and short-term ache [Mixed evidence][Globally persistent, US-weak post-2000]
The dimensions premium has been documented globally, however has been weak post-2000 within the US. Globally ex-US it has been extra persistent. Your technique leans on this — remember it may possibly underperform a large-cap or progress benchmark for five–7 yr stretches. This isn’t a flaw; it’s the value of the long-run premium.
Know this however not likely what I’m asking
f. Transaction prices in small/mid-cap are the silent killer [Critical risk][Most underestimated factor]
“Frequent reconstitution whereas controlling turnover” is the correct framing, however implementation is all the pieces. Small/mid-cap shares carry large bid-ask spreads and vital market impression on any significant place measurement.
At 100% annual turnover throughout 1,300 illiquid names, friction prices can eat 1.5–3% of gross return — straight and mechanically decreasing your earned yield. The phrase “controlling the turnover” in your conjecture is doing monumental work. It should be probably the most fastidiously engineered a part of any actual implementation.
g. Valuation re-rating threat is underappreciated [Real risk][Mitigated somewhat over 20-year horizons]
If the portfolio begins at 10% earnings yield and mean-reverts to 7% over 15 years (markets re-rate these shares increased), you really earn greater than 10% — the capital appreciation provides to the yield.
But when it strikes from 10% to 13% (de-rating, markets value them cheaper), you earn lower than 10% in complete return phrases, although each holding delivered its working money circulation. Beginning yield is important however not enough — the closing yield issues too.
What Critically Makes This Technique Work
Three engines drive the long-run return. All three should operate concurrently.
1. Earnings yield as a return anchor
When an organization generates 10% of its market cap in working money circulation and returns it by way of buybacks or dividends, shareholders obtain that return no matter value motion. Throughout 1,300 shares, this turns into a near-certain mixture cost — even when some particular person corporations fail or reduce payouts, the regulation of huge numbers works in your favour.
No progress required.
Buybacks = tax-efficient dividends.
2. Reconstitution as Darwinian choice
Every rebalance systematically removes corporations whose yield has compressed (costs rose an excessive amount of) or whose money flows have deteriorated (high quality declining), changing them with recent high-yield names. The portfolio’s character — high-quality, high-yield, worthwhile — stays fixed at the same time as its parts change. A static portfolio of 1,300 shares would drift into worth traps. Reconstitution prevents this.
Prevents terminal drift
Portfolio identification preserved
3. Worth × high quality intersection
Rating by OCF/Guide (adjusted for accruals) sits on the intersection of the worth issue and the standard/profitability issue. Educational proof reveals this mixture — “worth with a profitability display” — avoids worth traps and has produced persistent extra returns globally throughout a number of many years and areas.
Avoids worth traps
Accrual adjustment = cleaner sign.
4. Diversification suppresses idiosyncratic threat
At 1,300 names throughout areas and sectors, the portfolio’s return is pushed nearly fully by issue publicity, not stock-picking luck. Particular person firm failures, frauds, or sector dislocations change into noise. That is the important thing distinction between this technique and any concentrated guess — together with a concentrated guess on “good worth shares.”
Idiosyncratic threat + negligible
Issue return dominates.
The Central Perception, Restated Exactly
The technique doesn’t want any particular person firm to outlive 15–20 years. It wants the issue — high-quality OCF yield — to stay a sound financial sign over that interval. The proof strongly suggests it should.
The query isn’t “will these corporations stay?” however “will worthwhile corporations producing sturdy money flows, priced cheaply relative to these money flows, proceed to supply good long-run returns?” The historic reply throughout each measured area and interval is sure.
What Should be True for This Technique to Work?
a. It’s essential to maintain for the complete cycle — genuinely
15–20 years is the minimal for beginning yield to dominate over valuation noise. Shorter intervals are dominated by sentiment swings. You should be financially positioned to not want the capital throughout interim drawdowns — this requires sound monetary planning earlier than committing capital, not simply funding conviction after the actual fact.
b. The Working Money Circulate numbers should be actual, not accounting artefacts
The accrual adjustment handles most of this, however implementation should be rigorous. Knowledge vendor variations in computing working money circulation adjusted for accruals can meaningfully change which 1,300 shares are chosen. Backtests typically overstate returns as a result of they assume cleaner information than is accessible in actual time (look-ahead bias).
c. Transaction prices should be actively managed, not assumed away
Affected person buying and selling, crossing at mid-spread, utilizing a turnover funds, batching trades, and accepting monitoring error vs. a theoretical optimum portfolio are all crucial. The “controlling turnover” clause in your conjecture isn’t non-obligatory ornament — it’s the single most vital operational constraint.
d. The issue premium should persist
Worth × high quality has been among the many most sturdy components documented throughout areas and time. If world markets completely re-rate these shares — a sustained structural shift towards intangible-heavy progress corporations — the yield unfold might not mean-revert. This can be a small however non-zero structural threat over any given 15-year window.
The Educational Proof
a. Earnings yield predicts long-run fairness returns [Shiller 1981,1988]
Cyclically adjusted earnings yield (inverse CAPE) is among the strongest predictors of 10-year ahead fairness returns. On the portfolio stage, beginning yield explains roughly 60–70% of return variance over 10-year horizons.
The connection weakens at shorter time horizons (dominated by sentiment) and strengthens because the holding interval extends. That is the foundational empirical assist for your complete conjecture.
b. The worth issue and profitability issue — independently predictive [Fama & French 1992, 2015]
The book-to-market (worth) issue and the profitability (RMW) issue each independently predict extra returns globally. Critically, when mixed, they’re extra highly effective than both alone as a result of they aim completely different failure modes: worth with out profitability catches traps; profitability with out worth catches overpriced high quality. Your OCF/Guide metric combines each straight.
c. Gross profitability — the opposite facet of worth [Novy-Marx 2013]
Gross profitability (a cash-flow-based measure) has roughly the identical predictive energy for returns as the worth issue — and the 2 are negatively correlated. Combining them produces a dramatically cleaner sign. Your OCF/Guide metric is an in depth implementation of this actual mixture. That is presumably probably the most straight related single paper to your technique.
Probably the most related paper.
d. The accrual anomaly — companies with excessive accruals underperform [Sloan 1996]
Corporations with excessive accruals (the place reported earnings considerably exceed working money flows) systematically underperform in subsequent intervals. By adjusting OCF for accruals earlier than rating, your technique explicitly avoids holding the highest-accrual (most earnings-inflated) names. This is among the most robustly replicated anomalies in finance — your adjustment isn’t non-obligatory, it’s load-bearing.
e. Lengthy-run returns decomposed: yield + progress + re-rating [Dimson, Marsh & Staunton – Triumph of the Optimists (2002, annual updates)
Across 32 countries over 120+ years, equity returns closely track dividend yield + earnings growth + valuation change.
This three-component decomposition validates your framework precisely: if starting yield is 10%, earnings growth is modest, and re-rating is neutral, the 15–20 year return converges on approximately 10%. The return attribution is empirically stable across very long horizons.
Longest historical dataset.
f. Value factor timing and the necessity of patience [Asness, Moskowitz AQR]
Worth-oriented methods can underperform for five–10 yr intervals even when the long-run sign stays intact. Traders who abandon worth methods on the trough of underperformance destroy a lot of the long-run premium by exiting earlier than the mean-reversion materialises. The 2010–2020 US expertise is the clearest fashionable instance. This isn’t an argument in opposition to the technique — it’s an argument for internalising the behavioural value earlier than committing capital.
g. Replication disaster — which anomalies survive? [Hou, Xue & Zhang 2020; Harvey, Liu & Zhu 2016]
A big fraction of printed anomalies fail to duplicate out-of-sample, particularly after transaction prices. Nevertheless, earnings yield, worth, and profitability are persistently among the many handful that survive rigorous out-of-sample and post-publication checks. Your chosen components are within the “sturdy tier” — this can be a significant distinction. Not all components are created equal, and the replication literature validates your particular selections.
What Can Go Fallacious
a. Transaction prices in small/mid-cap are extreme and sometimes underestimated
Bid-ask spreads, market impression, and rebalancing prices in illiquid names aren’t trivial line gadgets — they straight and mechanically cut back your earned yield. A ten% gross yield portfolio with 2% in annual transaction prices earns 8%. Over 20 years, the distinction between 8% and 10% compounding is big. Small-cap tutorial backtests nearly universally understate real-world buying and selling prices.
Mitigation: Use a proper turnover funds. Settle for monitoring error vs. the theoretical optimum portfolio. Prioritise affected person execution. Think about semi-annual fairly than extra frequent reconstitution, and use crossing networks the place out there.
b. Behavioural threat — the investor, not the market, is the biggest menace
The technique may have 2–5 yr intervals of underperformance, particularly vs. a growth-heavy benchmark. Most buyers — even those that genuinely imagine they’re long-term — capitulate on the trough. In case you promote throughout a 5-year drawdown, you crystallise all of the losses and miss the imply reversion that follows. This isn’t a market threat; it’s a self-risk. It can’t be diversified away. It might solely be mitigated by means of pre-commitment: clear funding coverage, written down, agreed with all stakeholders, earlier than the underperformance begins.
c. Tax drag on reconstitution in taxable accounts
Frequent turnover in a taxable account converts long-term unrealised features into short-term taxable occasions. In most jurisdictions, this reduces net-of-tax return by 0.5–2% p.a. relying on turnover price and tax price. The technique is most acceptable in tax-deferred accounts (pension funds, retirement accounts, endowments) the place turnover has no tax value. In taxable accounts, the turnover funds should be tightened additional.
Jurisdiction dependent. Tax-deferred accounts most popular.
d. Knowledge and implementation threat — the metric isn’t standardised
Totally different information distributors compute “working money circulation adjusted for accruals” otherwise. The rating will change meaningfully relying on whether or not you employ Compustat, FactSet, Bloomberg, or native exchanges. Backtests on this metric ceaselessly profit from look-ahead bias (utilizing information that was not out there on the time of the rating choice). The sign is actual, however the particular shares chosen in any actual implementation will differ from the backtest — probably materially.
e. Structural shift threat — intangible financial system
Guide worth more and more understates the true asset base of corporations that put money into intangibles (software program, manufacturers, IP). OCF/Guide might systematically mis-identify tech-driven corporations as “low high quality” when they’re really prime quality with misclassified R&D spend as an expense fairly than an funding. This isn’t a deadly flaw — the profitability filter handles the worst circumstances — but it surely means the technique might structurally underweight the highest-growth sectors of recent economies.
f. Issue crowding — as extra capital chases the identical sign, the premium compresses
As institutional capital targets OCF/Guide indicators globally, the pricing benefit narrows. This has already occurred materially in large-cap worth. Small/mid-cap is much less crowded — however the pattern is in a single course. The premium might persist, however it’s unlikely to be as massive within the subsequent 20 years as prior to now 20 years. Your anticipated return anchor of 10% ought to account for some compression within the issue premium over the holding interval.
If you wish to commerce these shares I discussed, you’ll be able to open an account with Interactive Brokers. Interactive Brokers is the main low-cost and environment friendly dealer I take advantage of and belief to take a position & commerce my holdings in Singapore, the US, London Inventory Change and Hong Kong Inventory Change. They mean you can commerce shares, ETFs, choices, futures, foreign exchange, bonds and funds worldwide from a single built-in account.
You possibly can learn extra about my ideas about Interactive Brokers in this Interactive Brokers Deep Dive Sequence, beginning with find out how to create & fund your Interactive Brokers account simply.








